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THE PRIVILEGE OF A NEGRO CITIZEN TO VOTE IN A PRIMARY
The petitioner, a Negro citizen of Texas, having l een denied the
privilege to vote' in the Texas Democratic primary2 for federal and
state officers, brought an action for damages against ihe respondents
on the ground that such denial was based solely on the race and
color of the petitioner. The United States District Court refused the
relief requested and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
judgment3 on the authority of the Supreme Court's decision in the
case of Grovey v. Townsend.4 Certiorari was granted to dispel an
alleged inconsistency between the Grovey case and that of United States
v. Classic.5 Held, reversed; the decision in Grovey v. Townsend was
expressly overruled. Smith v. Allwright, Election Judge, et al., 321
U. S. 649 (1944). (Justice Roberts dissenting).6
The instant case is seemingly one of a series arsing from the
1. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const.
Amend. XV, § 1: "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, conor, or previous con-
dition of servitude." 16 Stat. 140 (1870), 8 U. S. C. A. §
31 (1942): "All citizens of the United States who are other-
wise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any
State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school
district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be
entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without dis-
tinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any con-
stitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Terri-
tory, or by or under its authority, to the controversy notwithstand-
ing."
2. Held on July 27, 1940.
3. Smith v. Allwright et al., 131 F.(2d) 593 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942).
4. 295 U. S. 45 (1935).
5. 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
6. In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Roberts criticed the Court's
present practice of overruling prior decisions. Such action, he said,
" . . . tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same
class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train
only." (p. 669). "It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt
and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of
thought and purpose, this. court, which has been looked to as ex-
hibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would
hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows
of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt
and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our in-
stitutions." (p. 670).
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efforts of the southern state of Texas to prevent the Negroes from
voting. Whether such "series" is terminated by this decision remains
to be seen; to some extent the answer is dependent upon the ability of
the southern state to "dodge"; the requirements of the federal con-
stitution and the present decision, and this in turn depends on whether
the "means" used to exclude the Negro is considered to be "state ac-
tion."s State action is clearly prohobited by the United States Con-
stitution.9
A review of prior cases indicates that what was and what was
not action by the state was conjectural at most and not factual. In
Nixon v. Herndon,' o the court found state action where the Texas
statute of 1923 provided that "in no event shall a negro be eligible
to participate in a Democratic primary electiqn held in the state of
Texas," with the obvious result that a stautute per se is state action.
By 1932 Texas had amended this statute so that the state execu-
tive committee of the Democratic party was empowered to prescribe
the qualifications of its members. Pursuant to that authority the
committee passed a resolution barring Negroes from voting in the
primary; such action was held unconstitutional in Nixon v. Condon"l
because it was carried out by an organ of the state and thus "state
action."
Later the Democratic State Convention2 adopted a resolution
which in substance prohibited Negroes from voting at primaries; this
method was held valid"3 as it was not state action. This result was
reached by the Supreme Court when it followed the reasoning of the
Texas Supreme Court in Bell v. Hill, which held that a Texas political
party was but a "voluntary association" for political action and not
an organ of the state. 4 Thus up to the time of the principal case
determination of party membership by the state executive committee
was invalid, while determination by the state convention was valid:
query, what is the mark of distinction? Apparently only that the
former acted under statutory authorization while the latter did not.15
7. See Willoughby, "Principles of the Constitutional Law of the
United States" (2d ed. 1935) § 234.
8. "The cases in which the equal protection clause has been definitely
held to prevent unreasonable discriminations in defining the right
to vote involved the exclusion of negroes from participation in
the primary elections of the Democratic party in some of the
southern states. The issue principally discussed in most of these
cases was whether the action of the party constituted action by
the state since the equal protection clause would apply only if
it were such." Rottschaefer, "Handbook of American Constitutional
Law" (1939) 753.
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
11. 286 U. S. 73 (1932).
12. Note that this is not the state executive committee as provided
in the stautute mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
13. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935), cited supra note 4.
14. Bell et al. v. Hill, County Clerk, et al., 125 Tex. 531, 534, 74 S. W.(2d) 113, 114 (1934).
15. See note 17 infra.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, concluded that the
case of United States v. Classic' 6 was relevant since it held that Con-
gress was authorized to regulate primary elections ". . where the
primary is by law made an integral part of the election ma-
chinery. .... .,17
The Court found state action present when thi party, under
statutory authority, conducted the primary election.'8 That the Court
thought a state should not encourage any discriminatory activity was
quite evident.19
The majority opinion conceded that the instant clse presented a
* . substantially similar factual situation. . ." as that found in the
Grovey case.20 Yet it maintained that " ...when convinced of former
error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." 21 It
seems reasonable to say that the Court was quite aware of its action,
and that it forcefully meant what it was deciding.
It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is sound.
The plain words of the United States Constitution aad their literal
and unmistakable meaning,22 could not easily dictate any other result.
CRIMINAL LAW
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED DURING REREADING
OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
After the jury had deliberated five or six hours over its verdict
on a rape charge, the judge, proposing to reread the instructions, called
16. 313 U. S. 299 (1941), cited supra note 5.
17. Id. at 318. The Classic decision was considered pertinent only
". .. because the recognition of the place of the primary in the
electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of
the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delega-
tion of a state function that may make the party~s action the ac-
tion of the State." Instant case at 660.
18. Instant case at 663. It was found that certain committees of the
party or its state convention would certify the party's candidates to
be included on the official ballot for the ensuing i'eneral election.
A name not so certified could not appear on thaIt ballot. This
statutory method of selection of party nominees recquired the party
which adhered to these directions to be ". . . an agency of the
State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary
election." Ibid. The Court said further that "the party takes its
character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by
state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law
because they are performed by a political party." Ibid.
19. "If the State requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a
general election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and
limits the choice of the electorate in general elections for state
officers, practically speaking, to those whose nanes appear on
such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination
against Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted by Texas law
with the determination of the qualifications of participants in the
primary. This is state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment." Id. at 664.
20. Instant case at 661.
21. Id. at 665.
22. See note 1 supra.
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